Promoting Confidence and Stability in Financial Markets: Capitalizing on the Downfall of Barings by Soper, Rochael M.
SOPER FINAL MACRO 12/10/97 4:22 PM
651
PROMOTING CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS:
CAPITALIZING ON THE DOWNFALL OF
BARINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Barings, P.L.C. (Barings) was the oldest investment firm in Brit-
ain and one of its most illustrious.  It was a 223-year-old financial in-
stitution that financed the Louisiana Purchase and the Napoleonic
Wars1 long before it served as an investment adviser to Queen Eliza-
beth II.2  Yet, despite a prominent history, this venerable institution
collapsed on February 26, 1995, as the result of a single trader’s de-
rivative activities in Singapore.3
The story of the Barings collapse raises a host of issues in deriva-
tives trading, risk management, systemic risk, and international secu-
rities and banking regulation.  In the aftermath of the collapse, many
questions and concerns have arisen.  How could an old, prominent,
and stable institution like Barings collapse so quickly?  Do other fi-
nancial institutions face similar risks?  What lessons can be learned
from Barings and steps implemented to prevent similar, if not more
catastrophic, collapses from occurring in the future?  More specifi-
cally, the collapse raises concerns about the regulation of derivative
activities by banks,4 involving both the proper scope and role of in-
ternational regulation of derivative activities as well as the proper ex-
tent and effectiveness of external regulatory controls.
This Note explores these questions and proposes possible solu-
1. See Barbara Sullivan & Ray Moseley, Old Bank, Modern Scandal; Manhunt Under
Way for ‘Rogue Trader’, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1995, at 1.
2. See Richard W. Stevenson, Markets Shaken as a British Bank Takes a Big Loss, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at A1.
3. Broadly defined, a derivative instrument is a contract whose value is derived from or is
dependent upon one or more underlying assets or indexes.  The primary economic function of
derivatives is the transfer of market risk resulting from an adverse change in the price of an
asset or portfolio of assets.  Derivatives can include a wide variety of financial contracts such as
forwards, futures, swaps, and options.  See Jane C. Kang, The Regulation of Global Futures
Markets: Is Harmonization Possible or Even Desirable?, 17 J. INTL. L. BUS. 242, 243 n.1 (1996).
4. See Paul A. Schott, Derivatives: A Primer on Bank Agency Actions For Managing
Risks, 14 No. 7 BANKING POL’Y REP. 1 (Apr. 3, 1995).
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tions to them.  Part II presents facts and events surrounding the col-
lapse of Barings.  Part III explores several of the factors which con-
tributed to the collapse by focusing on the findings presented and is-
sues raised in reports by the Board of Banking Supervision of the
Bank of England and by the Singapore Minister of Finance.  Part IV
examines the effects of the Barings collapse and considers those con-
cerns which underlie the collapse of major financial institutions gen-
erally.  Part V expands this analysis by examining lessons to be
learned from the collapse of Barings while proposing mechanisms
that may prevent a Barings-type situation from occurring in the fu-
ture.
II. THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS
At the age of twenty-seven, Nicholas Leeson was Barings’s head
arbitrage trader in Singapore.5  In late 1994, Leeson began to imple-
ment an options trading strategy premised on the assumption that the
Nikkei 225, an index of leading Japanese stocks, would remain within
a limited and narrow trading range.6  Leeson’s trading strategy was
simple: He would buy futures contracts at a comparatively low price
in one market, and then sell the same number of contracts at a
slightly higher price in a second.
The underlying value of such futures contracts is dictated by the
performance of the shares that constitute the index.  If the shares rise
in value, the futures contract is worth more; if the shares fall in value,
the contract is worth less.  The key to success in futures trading is
leverage: Buying a futures contract only requires a small proportion
of the value of the index to be paid up front.  Leveraging, therefore,
greatly magnifies any swings in the value of the index.  A large in-
crease in the index value may result in significant gains; a large de-
crease in the index value, on the other hand, may cause a complete
loss.7  Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, Leeson’s trading strategy failed
when a catastrophic earthquake hit Kobe, Japan on January 17, 1995.8
The quake’s economic aftershocks caused the Nikkei to fall substan-
tially, resulting in large losses on Leeson’s positions.9
5. See Richard W. Stevenson, Big Gambles, Lost Bets Sank a Venerable Firm, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A1.
6. See id. at D15.
7. See generally The Barings Crisis: The City’s Lost Weekend, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at
3.
8. See Stevenson, supra note 5, at A1.
9. See id.
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Rather than accepting his losses as the Japanese stock market
fell, Leeson doubled his bets, hoping to break even once the market
rose again.  After abandoning the arbitrage strategy he normally em-
ployed, Leeson began to buy Nikkei 225 futures on both the Singa-
pore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the Osaka Se-
curities Exchange.10  His gamble was that this position would turn a
profit if Japanese stock prices rose.  Leeson eventually built up fu-
tures positions on the two exchanges with a total notional value of
over $7 billion.11  Leeson also began to sell futures on both long and
short-term Japanese government debt instruments.12  Because inter-
est rates move inversely to the price of debt issues, Leeson believed
that the positions would be profitable if Japanese interest rates rose.13
These positions more than tripled, eventually growing to a notional
value of $22 billion.14  Leeson was able to conceal these losses by lo-
cating them in a special account, numbered 88888 (five-eights), which
he opened in July of 1992.15  This account was established to record
trading errors, which were typically small amounts cleared quickly as
adjustments were made.16
Unfortunately for Leeson and for Barings, both the Japanese
stock market and Japanese interest rates fell, resulting in huge losses
on all of his positions.17  Between late January and late February, in
an attempt to cover Leeson’s failing positions and stave off disaster,
Barings met margin calls that totaled over $400 million.18  On Febru-
ary 23, Leeson left Singapore, and the next day Barings’s CEO Peter
Baring was informed of the situation.19  By that time, Leeson’s open
positions had unrealized losses of nearly $1 billion.20  By day’s end on
Friday, February 24, Barings executives calculated that the losses on
10. See id.
11. See Tony Shale, Why Barings Was Doomed, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1995, at 40.
12. See Sheila C. Bair, Lessons From the Barings Collapse, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3
(1995).
13. See id.
14. See Stevenson, supra note 5, at 15.
15. See Uncovering the Cover-Up; Singapore Issues a Damning Report on the Barings Col-
lapse, ASIA WEEK, Oct. 27, 1995, at 48.
16. See id.  The Singapore Report, infra, reveals that the five-eights account was in deficit
by $1.5 million by May, 1993.
17. See Stevenson, supra note 5, at D15.
18. See Bair, supra note 12, at 3.
19. Leeson and his wife flew first to Kuala Lumpur and then on to Kota Kinabalu in Sa-
bah.  Leeson was eventually arrested in Frankfurt, Germany on March 1, while he and his wife
were en route to London.  See Uncovering the Cover-Up, supra note 15, at 48.
20. See Stevenson, supra note 5, at D15.
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Leeson’s positions exceeded the company’s net worth.21
Barings’s executives immediately informed the Bank of England,
the primary regulator for both investment houses and commercial
banks in Britain.22  Over the following weekend, the Bank of England
calculated the losses in excess of $750 million and initiated an at-
tempt to rescue Barings.23  Because many of the contracts Leeson had
accumulated on the Japanese markets were still open, Barings was
exposed to unquantifiable further losses until those contracts expired
or were otherwise closed.  Rescuing Barings proved to be an impos-
sible task, and on Sunday, February 25, administrative orders24 were
granted in respect to nine key Barings companies.25  The next day, the
Singapore exchange agreed to take over Barings’s contracts and
manage their orderly liquidation.26  Soon thereafter, Barings’s pro-
prietary positions on SIMEX, the Osaka Securities Exchange, the
Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange, and the Tokyo
Stock Exchange were all liquidated,27 resulting in an aggregate loss of
approximately $1.4 billion.28
In early March, Internationale Nederlanden Group (ING), a
Dutch bank and insurance firm, purchased Barings’s entire business
for one British pound.29  ING subsequently dismissed twenty-one
Barings executives who had direct or indirect responsibility for the
Singapore operation.30  Thus, a financial empire, constructed over two
centuries, was undone.31
21. See Stevenson, supra note 2, at D1.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. “Administration” is the British equivalent of bankruptcy in the United States.  See
Bair, supra note 12, at 4.
25. See Andrew Wilkinson, The Insolvency of Financial Institutions—The English Ap-
proach, 721 PLI/COMM 493 (Sept. 1995).
26. See Stevenson, supra note 2, at D1.
27. See Bair, supra note 12, at 4.
28. See Shale, supra note 11, at 40.
29. See id.
30. See Richard W. Stevenson, Germany Orders Leeson Extradited to Singapore, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at D6.
31. On December 2, 1995 a court in Singapore sentenced Leeson to six and a half years in
prison for illegally covering up trading losses that led to the Barings collapse.  As part of a plea
bargain, Leeson pled guilty to two charges of cheating, and the prosecution dropped the re-
maining nine criminal charges of fraud and forgery.  See Singapore Sentences Leeson to 6 ½
Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at 35.
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III. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE BARINGS COLLAPSE
Sole responsibility for the Barings collapse was immediately at-
tributed to Nicholas Leeson, dubbed by many the “rogue trader” of
Barings.32  That one person acting alone could topple an institution
such as Barings suggested that even the strictest controls, either by a
company’s management or by its external regulators, would be inef-
fective in preventing similar types of fraud, and raised the specter of
similar collapses in the future.  Further inquiry, however, reveals that
Leeson’s activities could and should have been detected and that the
Barings collapse ought, therefore, to have been prevented.  The dis-
cussion which follows reveals how internal management controls, ex-
ternal auditors, and even some regulatory authorities, all share a
measure of responsibility for the collapse of Barings.
Following the debacle, two main inquiries were launched.  The
first was made by the Board of Banking Supervision of the Bank of
England, which published a 337-page report of its findings on July 18,
199533 (U.K. Report).  The second was conducted by two partners at
the accounting firm Price Waterhouse, appointed as Inspectors by the
Singaporean Minister of Finance to investigate the affairs of Baring
Futures Singapore (BFS)34 (Singapore Report).  The relevant findings
of each report are discussed below.
A. U.K. Report
The U.K. Report made three relevant findings: (1) Barings’s
losses were caused by unauthorized and concealed trading activities
within BFS; (2) the company’s true position was not noticed earlier
because of serious control failures and managerial confusion within
the Barings Group; and (3) this position had not been detected prior
to the collapse by the external auditors, supervisors, or regulators of
Barings.35  Thus, according to the U.K. Report, the collapse was
caused by a breakdown of responsibilities in three areas: internal
management and controls, external auditors, and regulatory authori-
32. See, e.g., the Chicago Tribune’s headline “Old Bank, Modern Scandal; Manhunt Under
Way for ‘Rogue Trader,’” supra note 1.
33. See BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK OF ENGLAND, INVESTIGATION INTO
THE FAILURE OF BARINGS (1995).
34. See Report by Singapore Inspectors on Barings Futures (Singapore), FIN. REG. REP.,
Oct. 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.  The 183-page Singapore Report was published
on October 17, 1995.
35. See HM Treasury—Barings—Statement by the Chancellor, HERMES—U.K. GOVT.
PRESS RELEASE, July 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textline.
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ties.
Leeson had complete power to oversee both the trading activi-
ties of BFS and its “back office systems,” those systems that provide
for the settlement of accounting transactions.36  No independent
Barings official reviewed and verified Leeson’s transactions and en-
sured that his trading activity stayed within acceptable risk levels.
Thus, Leeson was not properly supervised, due in part to confusion
concerning the internal chain of command.
The U.K. Report concluded that such a massive unauthorized
position could not have been established had Barings maintained an
effective system of management and operational controls.  Barings’s
banking operation in London, Barings Brothers & Co. (BB&Co.),
funded BFS through Barings Securities Ltd. (BSL), on a no-
questions-asked basis.  BB&Co. did not assess counterparty risks,
verify funding requests or reconcile records, nor did it establish
whether the funds requested were for client or proprietary trading.
BB&Co. advanced the money ultimately lost in Singapore to BSF
without an independent check on the request’s validity or an attempt
to reconcile losses with any known trading position.  If the manage-
ment at BB&Co. had examined the information from Singapore, they
likely would have discovered that the information given to them was
meaningless.37  Senior management thus failed to inquire into how a
supposedly risk-free arbitrage operation could generate such ex-
traordinarily high levels of profit.38  The U.K. Report concluded that
these profits should have been regarded as abnormal and question-
able, and that the extraordinary profitability reported in 1994 should
have attracted management’s attention long before the February
1995 collapse.39
The U.K. Report also criticized Coopers & Lybrand Singapore
(C&L Singapore), the auditors for BFS.  C&L Singapore completed
an assessment of BFS’s internal controls in November 1994, which
concluded that the company’s safeguards were satisfactory.  The U.K.
Report observed that “this conclusion was . . . not readily compatible
with the fact that there was a lack of segregation between front and
back office.”40  Similarly, Coopers & Lybrand London (C&L Lon-
36. See Bair, supra note 12, at 4.
37. See Statement by the Chancellor, supra note 35.
38. See The Wider Lessons of Barings, FIN. TIMES LTD. FIN. REG. REP., July 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
39. See Statement by the Chancellor, supra note 35.
40. The Wider Lessons of Barings, supra note 38.
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don) audited BB&Co.’s operations for both 1993 and 1994.  The U.K.
Report challenges the effectiveness of C&L London’s testing of
Barings’s internal controls and proposes that more thorough tests
would likely have revealed the inadequate support for Singapore’s
funding requests.41
The U.K. Report did not suggest that events leading up to the
Barings collapse called for any fundamental change in the U.K.’s
regulatory framework.  However, the U.K. Report does contain two
major criticisms of the Bank of England’s supervisory performance
with regard to Barings.  First, the Bank of England erred in 1993 in
giving BB&Co. an “informal concession” with respect to a bank’s
normal obligation to notify it, in advance, of margin exposures which
represent more than twenty-five percent of its capital base.  This er-
ror in judgment resulted in almost two years of confusion about
whether or not Barings’s margin exposure should be subject to the
standard 25 percent limit.  This ambiguity permitted the open-ended
build-up of Barings’s exposure on the SIMEX.42  Second, the Bank of
England did not rigorously consider the effects of permitting BSL
and BB&Co to be supervised on a joint or “solo consolidated” basis.43
This supervisory agreement consolidated Barings’s banking and secu-
rities businesses, leaving no limit on the intra-group funding of Bar-
ings’s securities operations by its banking arm.  This was the first time
that a major securities company had been solo consolidated with a
bank.44  In effect, this meant that BB&Co. was able to use its bank
deposits to remit large advances to BFS via BSL.45  Although ostensi-
bly to finance client trading, this funding was actually used to
“subsidize” unauthorized speculative activity.46
In addition, the U.K. Report examined closely whether any ex-
ecutives in London acted in collusion with Nicholas Leeson, and
whether there was an attempt to “cover-up” evidence that should
have alerted executives earlier.  The Board was unable to determine
Leeson’s motives or whether he was acting alone.47
41. See Statement by the Chancellor, supra note 35.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Illustrative of the problematic nature of this arrangement is the fact that in the first
three weeks of February alone, Barings remitted nearly $1 billion to BFS.  See Uncovering the
Cover-Up, supra note 15, at 48.
45. See The Wider Lessons of Barings, supra note 38.
46. See id.
47. See Statement by the Chancellor, supra note 35.
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B. Singapore Report48
The Singapore Report was more critical than the U.K. Report,
concluding that Barings officials knew much of what was going on
and sought to hide Leeson’s losses and even thwart investigations
into Leeson’s activities.  The differences in the two reports, however,
do not alter this Note’s analysis of the implications and lessons of the
Barings collapse.
The Singapore Report blamed the Barings collapse on the losses
incurred as a result of Leeson’s allegedly unauthorized and concealed
trades in Singapore.49  It noted that management failings, a lack of in-
ternal controls, weaknesses in internal and external audits, and poor
external supervision allowed the situation to develop.  Specifically,
three problems were cited: (1) management’s failure to segregate the
trading and settlement functions of BFS; (2) the absence of effective
controls over Leeson’s activities; and (3) the lack of coordination
among the Barings Group’s different departments, each of which
dealt with matters arising from Leeson’s trading activities.  The Sin-
gapore Report also criticized the supervisory performance of the
Bank of England, the performance of external auditors, and the
regulatory performance of the SIMEX.50
48. The Singapore report highlighted ten issues identified as significantly impacting the
Barings collapse:
Whether there was any weakness in organizational structure and controls which re-
sulted in Leeson’s activities not being effectively monitored or controlled (chap. 4);
To what extent the internal audit had identified warning signals that ought to have
alerted the Barings Group to the need to monitor and control Leeson more closely
(chap. 5);
To what extent the Compliance Department was responsible for checking Leeson and
his activities (chap. 6);
To what extent a proper system was in place for monitoring the Barings Group’s risk
exposure and the role of ALCO [the Asset and Liability Committee] (chap. 7);
How BSL Settlements identified and resolved concerns stemming from Leeson’s ac-
tivities (chap. 8);
How Group Treasury dealt with funds requested by Leeson to maintain his trading
positions (chap. 9);
The role of Financial Controls and Credit Control in relation to Leeson’s activities
(chaps. 10 and 11);
To what extent FPG [the Financial Products Group] and its senior managers contrib-
uted to Leeson’s ability to function as he did  (chap. 12);
How this state of affairs escaped the regulatory reporting regime that the Barings
Group was subject to (chap. 13); and
To what extent external controls may have been negated (chaps. 14 and 15).
See generally Report by Singapore Inspectors on Baring Futures (Singapore), supra note 34.
49. See generally id.
50. See id.
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IV. EFFECTS OF THE BARINGS COLLAPSE
After Leeson had been found, ING purchased Barings, and the
fatal contracts were satisfied, some may have questioned whether the
Barings affair was worthy of much thought or concern.  Indeed, in
some respects the repercussions of the entire affair may seem rela-
tively minor.  Immediately following the collapse, for example, there
was no acute sense of crisis in Singapore even though the ill-fated
bets had been made there.51  SIMEX, which traded the futures and
options that made up Leeson’s positions, limited the effects of the
crisis by taking over Barings’s contracts and managing their liquida-
tion, thereby keeping losses at a minimum.52  In addition, other ef-
fects of the collapse such as the damage done to London’s reputation
for safe financial dealing and personal losses incurred by a number of
Barings’s investors, may be regarded as the price paid for taking part
in risky financial games.  Some may view the Barings affair as a just
ending for a financial institution which played the high-stakes deriva-
tives game.  Finally, history reveals that February 26, 1995 was not
the first time Barings had “gone bust”; the first “Barings Crisis” oc-
curred in London in 1890.53  Barings recovered from that loss, as have
other financial institutions in similar situations.  Consequently, one
may legitimately ask whether there is a need to be concerned about
the effects of this or similar collapses of financial institutions.54
A look at some of the collapse’s global effects, however, illus-
trates the serious impact of Barings and of these types of downfalls.
In Tokyo, nervousness caused by the Barings collapse sent stock
prices rapidly downward.55  The Nikkei index closed down 660.33
51. See Stevenson, supra note 2, at D1.
52. See id.
53. For a brief history of the first “Barings Crisis,” see Andrew St. George, Second Crisis
Hits Bankers to the Great and the Good; Barings Served Kings and Emperors, It Has Had a
Hand in the Creation of the US and Financed Russia, But Its Luck May Have Run Out, THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 27, 1995, at 25.
54. Any lingering doubt about the potential recurrence of such rogue activities by individ-
ual traders should have been dispelled in June 1996, when Sumitomo Corporation announced
that it had lost an estimated $1.8 billion due to unauthorized copper trading by former chief
copper trader, Yasuo Hamanaka.  See Japan Traders Wary of Copper Market After Sumitomo,
REUTERS FINANCIAL SERVICE, Oct. 22, 1996.  In a remarkable parallel to the Barings collapse,
the events surrounding Sumitomo spanned three jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, where Su-
mitomo was trading on the London Metal Exchange (LME), the United States, where the LME
recently had established a warehouse for delivery of copper and where copper is traded on the
New York Mercantile Exchange, and Japan where Sumitomo is legally domiciled.  See Kang,
supra note 3, at 242.
55. See Stevenson, supra note 2, at A1.
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points,56 or 3.8 percent, the largest one-day fall since the financial af-
tershock of the Kobe earthquake itself.57  The Barings collapse
pushed stocks down in over a dozen countries in Asia and Europe as
investors tried to recover their assets without getting caught in the
eddies of the collapse.58  Additionally, the British pound fell to an his-
toric low against the German mark.59  These results illustrate the ease
with which a single financial institution located in one country
(England) was able to establish trading practices in a second nation
halfway around the globe (Singapore), and thereby affect financial
markets worldwide (Hong Kong, Japan, England) through its mis-
managed operations.
To this point, the United States has not been mentioned as being
significantly affected by the Barings collapse.  Nevertheless, Ameri-
can investors ought to be concerned by international market disrup-
tions such as those caused by the Barings collapse.  For example,
there has been a trend in recent years for U.S. investors to purchase
mutual funds and closed-end funds which invest in foreign securities
markets as well as acquiring the debt and equity securities of foreign
issuers.  Purchases and sales by U.S. investors of foreign debt and eq-
uity securities, which in 1980 amounted to $35.2 billion and $17.9 bil-
lion, respectively, grew to $815 billion and $1,829.4 billion, respec-
tively, in 1994.60  In 1994 approximately 5.5 percent of U.S. investors’
equity holdings was represented by foreign equities.61  Additionally,
foreign purchases and sales of debt and equity securities of U.S. com-
panies, which were $9 billion and $75 billion, respectively, in 1980,
grew to $222 billion and $708 billion, respectively, in 1994.62  Since
1984, foreign trading on the New York Stock Exchange has risen at a
compound rate of 18.5 percent, a rate which outstrips annual volume
on the NYSE which has grown at 12.34 percent.63
Should a Barings-type scenario repeat itself, even if losses are
confined to the London or the Hong Kong exchanges, American in-
56. See id. at D1.
57. See Sullivan & Moseley, supra note 1.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995: THE NATIONAL DATA
BOOK, tbl. 826; SIA, 18 FOREIGN ACTIVITY: AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN
THE U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS No. 2 (Apr. 1995).
61. See Cochrane, Shapiro, & Tobin, Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down
the Barriers Separating Supply and Demand 4 (NYSE Working Paper No. 95-04, 1995).
62. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 60, at 817; SIA, supra note 60.
63. See NYSE Fact Book 1994.
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vestors with interests in mutual funds comprised mostly of stocks
trading on those exchanges would feel the effects of the collapse.  In
the same vein, it is easy to imagine “emerging markets funds” suf-
fering large losses due to the collapse of an institution with a domi-
nant presence in the developing market in which the fund has in-
vested.
Thus, the primary concern for bank regulators to address in the
aftermath of Barings is systemic risk.  Systemic risk is described as
the risk that illiquidity or failure of one institution, and its resulting
inability to meet its obligations when due, will lead to the illiquidity
or failure of other institutions.64  Banks that engage in derivative ac-
tivities in an imprudent manner are exposed to great risk and, conse-
quently, face significant potential losses that could jeopardize major
firms or even the financial system as a whole.65  The inability of one
bank to meet its contractual obligations has the potential to create a
domino effect, toppling one financial institution after another.  In an-
other scenario, the widespread reliance of investors on dynamic
hedging strategies during a market disturbance could turn an other-
wise containable market downturn into an illiquidity-driven crash.66
Although systemic risk concerns are more prevalent today because of
the increased interdependence of the world’s economies, Barings did
not cause a domino effect, nor did the effects of Barings rise to the
level of an illiquidity-driven crash.  Nevertheless, the ever-increasing
development and use of derivatives and other innovative financial in-
struments, combined with the ever-increasing interdependence of fi-
nancial markets, suggest that any lessons from past failures should be
heeded.  Any sort of financial debacle carries with it a risk that
threatens the stability of financial markets and investor confidence in
those markets.  Ironically, the Barings collapse may have been of just
the right magnitude to force regulators, managers, and traders to re-
evaluate current practices and improve risk management and trading
activities before a greater financial crisis occurs.
V. LESSONS FROM BARINGS: PREVENTING FUTURE
FINANCIAL CRISES
In a report to Parliament, Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth
Clarke stated, “In cases such as [Barings] it is important that lessons
64. See Adam R. Waldman, Comment: OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Fi-
nance or the Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 1023, 1053-54 (Spring 1994).
65. See Schott, supra note 4.
66. See Waldman, supra note 64, at 1054.
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are learnt quickly and promulgated widely, so that all parties, in-
cluding the management of other financial institutions, can learn
from the unfortunate example.”67  The Barings collapse offers impor-
tant lessons for financial managers, traders, and regulators, and pro-
vides them the opportunity to evaluate and improve their current
practices where necessary.  The U.K. Report noted three levels of
protection that might have prevented the build-up of such concealed
losses: internal management controls, the external auditing process,
and supervision by relevant regulatory authorities.68  Lessons from
Barings may be organized first around internal management control,
and second around external regulatory control and cooperation.69
A. Internal Lessons
Internal lessons refer to those steps a financial institution can
implement to improve itself in order to prevent a Barings-type col-
lapse.  Four interrelated steps include the following: (1) managerial
incentives; (2) independent risk-management systems; (3) appropri-
ate oversight; and (4) risk management processes.  Each of these will
be discussed in turn.
1.  Managerial Incentives.  Banks should structure employee
compensation schemes to avoid potential incentives for excessive
risk-taking.70  Barings’s executive management held Barings’s voting
share capital, and the non-voting share capital was held by the
Barings Foundation, a U.K. registered entity.  The executive
management voted themselves a remuneration policy under which
approximately fifty percent of pre-tax profits went directly into a
bonus pool.  This policy created a ratio of bonus to basic salary of
75:25, or more, at the director level.71  Within this general scheme,
Leeson’s bonus for 1994 was a large multiple of his basic salary,
reflecting the false level of profitability reported by him.  In other
words, Barings resembled a partnership so far as profit distribution
was concerned, but management was protected by limited liability
with respect to losses.  This structure created an incentive for top
67. Statement by the Chancellor, supra note 35.
68. See The Wider Lessons of Barings, supra note 38.
69. This Note does not attempt to outline every possible internal and external control de-
vice needed to assure safety in derivatives trading.  Rather, it merely discusses certain areas in
which control devices suggested by the Barings experience may be improved and implemented.
70. See Schott, supra note 4.
71. See The Wider Lessons of Barings, supra note 38.
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managers to avoid scrutinizing the source of Leeson’s trading profits,
which would contribute significantly to the bonus pool.  A large
portion of the profits from Leeson’s unauthorized risk-taking would
go to management, while catastrophic losses would be borne by
others, including non-voting shareholders—the Barings Foundation,
for example.72  Accordingly, the challenge for banks and bank
managers is to structure their institutional compensation programs so
as to discourage excessive risk-taking.  This step can and should be
buttressed by implementation of the next three steps.
2.  Independent Risk Management Systems.  Firms engaged in
significant derivatives trading should separate risk management
systems from trading functions and develop independent lines of
reporting authority reaching to the highest levels of senior
management.73  An important element of risk management is the
independence of individuals in charge of measuring, monitoring, and
controlling risks on behalf of the bank.74  These individuals should be
managed independently of those conducting trading activities, all the
way through senior levels of management.75  As noted, Leeson was in
charge of both the front and back offices at BFS.  Had this
responsibility been divided between two people, a system of checks
and balances would have ensured that Leeson’s trading was
legitimate and within appropriate risk levels.
3.  Appropriate Oversight.  Management needs to understand the
business in which they are engaged and establish tight internal
controls.  Former Barings employees claim that senior executives in
London frequently demonstrated a fundamental ignorance about
derivatives.76  If a manager does not understand a product, it is easy
for a trader to convince the manager that extraordinary profits or
losses are unique to that product and are, therefore, appropriate.
Had Barings’s management understood derivatives more fully, they
would perhaps have been more skeptical about the size of the profits
Leeson’s trading generated.
Similarly, senior management should institute adequate policies
and procedures for conducting derivative activities on both long-term
72. See id.
73. See Bair, supra note 12, at 5.
74. See Schott, supra note 4.
75. See id.
76. See Shale, supra note 11.
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and day-to-day bases.  Such a policy would include obtaining neces-
sary approval and ensuring clear lines of responsibility for managing
risk, adequate systems for measuring risk, limits on risk-taking, and a
comprehensive risk reporting system.77  Additionally, a bank’s board
of directors should approve all significant policies relating to risk
management throughout the bank.  Policies regarding risks of deriva-
tive activities should be consistent with the bank’s overall business
strategy, capital adequacy, management expertise, and general will-
ingness to accept risk.  The board should regularly receive informa-
tion on risk exposure and reevaluate risk management policies, pro-
cedures, and tolerances.78
The role of appropriate oversight mechanisms illustrates the in-
ter-relatedness of improving internal controls.  If an institution is
structured similarly to Barings, where management had incentives
not to be prudent in the trading activities of its BFS subsidiary, man-
agement will be unlikely to implement the policies and procedures
necessary to regulate those activities.
4.  Risk Management Processes.  Derivative risk management
components are fundamental to all risk-taking by banks and should
be integrated with their overall risk management systems.79  A bank’s
system for measuring the various risks inherent in derivative
activities should be comprehensive and accurate.  Risks should be
measured and aggregated across trading and non-trading activities on
a bank-wide basis, and the systems implemented should accurately
reflect the multiple types of risks involved.  This emphasis on creating
“bank-wide” strategies is applicable precisely where an institution’s
subsidiary, such as BFS, might be used to swiftly deplete an
institution’s entire capital.  Had Barings incorporated the risks taken
in its Singapore subsidiary (presuming, of course, that managers were
aware of the risks) into a bank-wide risk assessment plan, perhaps it
would have succeeded in restricting some of its subsidiary’s activities.
Banks should also analyze situations in advance, including com-
binations of market conditions, which may place their operations un-
der stress.  These analyses should include not only the probability of
adverse events, but also plausible “worst case” scenarios.  They
should also consider qualitative analyses of the actions management
77. See Schott, supra note 4.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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might take under particular contingencies.80  It is unlikely that Leeson
or anyone at Barings ever contemplated the Kobe earthquake, and
few would argue that trading should be done on so conservative a ba-
sis that plans for such catastrophic events are in place.  Nevertheless,
the notion that banks should analyze possible “worst case” scenarios,
including the ramifications and probabilities of natural disasters, rep-
resents a prudent strategy following the collapse of Barings.
Banks should also have an information system that monitors and
reports their risk management measures, passing the data gleaned on
to appropriate senior management and to the board of directors.81
One commentator suggests that for dealer operations, exposures and
profit loss statements should be reported at least daily to managers
who supervise but do not conduct trading activities.82  More frequent
reports should be made as market conditions dictate.  Reports to
other levels of senior management and to the board may occur less
frequently, but they must include adequate information for them to
evaluate the changing nature of the bank’s risk profile.83
Furthermore, a bank should set boundaries for organizational
risk-taking and ensure that positions exceeding certain predeter-
mined levels receive prompt attention from management.84  Had this
type of system been in place within Barings, its management would
have been alerted to Leeson’s positions.  These guidelines illustrate
once again the comprehensive approach required when improving in-
ternal controls because any such guidelines would prove useless if in-
ternal corporate structures encourage management to turn a blind
eye to these warning signs.
Finally, regular review and evaluation of banks’ risk manage-
ment processes are necessary components of a prudent risk manage-
ment system.  This review should assess the methodologies, models,
and assumptions used to measure risk and limit exposure.85  The ex-
tent to which banks should reevaluate, and the frequency of those re-
evaluations, depend, in part, on the specific risk exposures created by
trading activities, the pace and nature of market changes, and the
pace of innovation with respect to measuring and managing risks.  At
a minimum, banks with significant trading and derivative activities
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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should review the underlying methodologies or their models at least
annually, and more often as market conditions dictate.86
5.  A Note on Capital Adequacy.  No problems associated with
capital adequacy requirements were mentioned by either the U.K. or
Singapore report; neither report found such requirements to be
contributing factors in the Barings collapse.  Although Barings was
highly capitalized, the losses incurred by Leeson exceeded anyone’s
expectations.  Furthermore, it is recognized that capital adequacy
requirements alone do not provide adequate safeguards against the
risks associated with derivative activities.87  Nevertheless, derivative
activities should be fully supported by an adequate capital position
and capital adequacy requirements should be modified to recognize
the complexities inherent in derivative activities.88
B. External Lessons
Following the collapse of Barings, the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision89 (the Committee) issued guidance to bank su-
pervisors worldwide.  The Committee recognized the fact that deriva-
tives are a global issue, not merely a national one, and realized the
need for a single supervisory framework.  The Committee’s guidance
was issued simultaneously through a joint press release with the
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions that expressed similar guidance.90  The joint release
emphasized that the derivative activities of banks and securities firms
give rise to similar risks, and that both industries should use similar
risk management practices.  The global nature of financial markets
makes it clear that international trading in derivatives could benefit
from international guidelines.  The United States already has in place
guidelines and safeguards which, if implemented internationally,
could help reduce the risk of a Barings-type collapse and its effects in
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. For discussion of the evolution of capital adequacy requirements for banks’ derivative
activities, see Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives, 2 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 167 (1995).
89. Established in 1975, the Basle Committee is a committee of banking supervisory
authorities comprised of banking regulators from twelve industrialized nations.  The Commit-
tee’s primary aim is to promote gradual transnational convergence of supervisory practices
governing financial institutions.  See J.J. NORTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BANKING
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE 1990’S at 265
(1994).
90. See Schott, supra note 4.
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other markets.
1.  The United States as a Model.  Some observers believe that
the Barings collapse could not have happened in U.S. markets.91  The
United States operates a sophisticated set of safeguards designed to
give the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and its
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) advance warning when an
individual firm’s futures trading may be approaching dangerous
levels.92  In a situation like Barings, which involved unusually large
positions, the CFTC’s first line of defense would be its market
surveillance system.93  The CFTC and all U.S. futures exchanges
maintain large trader reporting systems so that if a trader’s positions
exceeds a “reportable level,”  it must file certain information about
itself with the CFTC.94  When a trader’s position crosses the threshold
and becomes reportable, the trader must provide the CFTC with the
name and phone number of the person who controls trading in the
account and the identity of any other accounts controlled by that
individual.95  Futures commission merchants are also required to file
daily reports concerning all accounts they carry which exceed
reportable levels.96  These reports can then be cross-checked with
other reports filed by the individual traders.  Accounts under
common ownership or control are aggregated for reporting purposes
so that a trader cannot avoid the CFTC’s reporting requirements by
controlling a number of small accounts below the reporting
threshold.97
Information on large traders is filed electronically.98  Information
reflecting positions of traders as of the market close on Monday is
available by Tuesday morning to the CFTC surveillance economist
responsible for monitoring a given contract.  Large, unusual, or con-
centrated positions are carefully scrutinized, and the CFTC surveil-
lance staff briefs the Commission weekly on any unusual market
conditions.
In addition to looking at unusual positions or market conditions,
U.S. market surveillance systems also monitor compliance with limits
91. See generally Bair, supra note 12.
92. See id. at 5.
93. See id.
94. 17 C.F.R. § 18.04 (1995).
95. See id. § 18.04.
96. See id. § 17.00.
97. See id. § 18.01.
98. See id. § 17.02.
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on speculative positions.99  For example, the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change’s speculative limit for the Nikkei 225 is 5,000 contracts.100  Any
exemptions from the limits, such as hedge positions, must be thor-
oughly documented.101  In the United States, Leeson’s positions
would have triggered a review by exceeding preset speculative limits.
Similarly, a review of the evidence submitted to obtain a hedge ex-
emption would have occurred, including a review of any related cash
market position.  Thus, the extensive information sharing agreements
among the CFTC, U.S. futures markets, and the CFTC’s securities
counterparts would enable the CFTC to independently verify
whether a trader, such as Leeson, was holding positions that might
offset large stock index futures positions.102  Moreover, both the
CFTC and the exchanges closely monitor compliance with financial
integrity rules.103  Financial surveillance systems on the exchanges
routinely produce “exception reports” which provide information
about firms which carry large positions, sustain a series of losses over
time, or have the potential to generate large losses relative to the
amount the firm has on deposit or the amount of the firm’s capital.
The exchanges are also required to do stress testing to monitor the
vulnerability of their members during times of market volatility.104
Finally, U.S. exchanges have affirmative duties to supervise their
markets as a matter of law.105  The CFTC also conducts regular re-
views of the exchanges’ self-regulatory and enforcement programs,
and issues public “report cards” grading the exchanges’ perform-
ance.106
Many of the above-described safeguards could be implemented
globally to alert markets to abnormal situations before they escalate.
For example, the Singapore Report, supra, criticized the SIMEX for
being too liberal in raising Barings’s position limits.  Global limits
could be set for each major type of risk involved and could provide
99. See Bair, supra note 12, at 6.
100. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 4402(D) (1994).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 19.00(b)(1) (1995).
102. See Bair, supra note 12, at 6.
103. See id. at 7.
104. See id.
105. Under CFTC regulations, every contract market is required to use “due diligence” to
maintain a “continuing affirmative action program” to secure compliance with the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994), the CFTC’s regulations, and the exchange’s rules.  17
C.F.R. § 1.51 (1995).  See also id.
106. See 7 U.S.C. § 12e (1994).
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the capability to allocate limits for individual business units.107
2.  International Regulatory Cooperation.  The U.K. Report
failed to address an issue that cannot escape discussion, namely,
weaknesses in international regulatory coordination.108  In accounting
for risks posed by subsidiaries of securities firms, regulators have to
rely, to a large extent, on foreign supervisory authorities to ensure
that overseas subsidiaries are prudently managed.109  In the months
preceding the Barings collapse, regulatory authorities representing
the U.K., Japan, and Singapore failed to communicate sufficiently
with one another.  This failure underscores the urgency for a clear
multilateral agreement designed to coordinate international
securities market regulation, perhaps along the lines of the existing
Basle agreement on the coordination of international banking
regulation.110
A related issue requires consideration of the different ap-
proaches taken by bank and securities regulators.  Under the Basle
Concordat,111 bank regulators are obliged to include foreign subsidi-
aries in their consolidated supervision of banking groups; 112 securities
regulators, on the other hand, are not subject to such obligations.113
The SFA stated in relation to Barings that it made no attempt to as-
sess the risks posed by BSL’s foreign securities operations, including
BFS.  For a business which mixes banking and securities operations,
as Barings did with large intra-group financial flows and complex
cross-guarantees and comfort letters, this dual approach to regulation
makes little sense since the parent bank is exposed to the risks in-
curred by all its affiliated units, including overseas securities opera-
tions.114
A final issue concerns the dangers that accompany a solo con-
solidation of a bank and a securities firm.  Under solo consolidation,
107. See Schott, supra note 4.
108. See The Wider Lessons of Barings, supra note 38.
109. See id.
110. See id.;  see also Norton, supra note 89.
111. The Concordat seeks to identify basic principles governing the responsibilities of host
and home country regulators in the event of the failure or threatened failure of a bank operat-
ing across borders.  See COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY
PRACTICES: REVISED BASLE CONCORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’
FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 900 (1983).
112. See id. at 907.
113. See The Wider Lessons of Barings, supra note 38.
114. See id.
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a securities firm may be able to expand risky business through “soft”
funding from its affiliated bank, just as Barings did.  The fundamental
question to be asked is how appropriate is it for banks, and bank de-
posits, to be used as a funding source for an affiliated securities firm,
particularly given the fact that bank deposits represent “subsidized”
funding to the extent that depositors are protected by the official in-
surance safety net.  Arguably, bank deposits should be withheld from
high-risk, aggressively managed securities businesses unless they re-
flect the manifest risks involved.115
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of where fault lay—whether with Nicholas Leeson,
senior management, Barings’s external auditors, the Bank of Eng-
land, or with the SIMEX—a 223-year-old financial institution came
crashing to its knees in a matter of months.  The Barings collapse did
not result in worldwide financial crisis, nor did it topple institution af-
ter institution when it failed to meet its own obligations on SIMEX
futures contracts.  However, it is precisely the interplay of these ob-
servations that makes the Barings story not only interesting but im-
portant in the context of global financial institutions.  The collapse
may have been of precisely the magnitude necessary to alert the
world to the fact that derivatives are risky, that losses can spiral out
of control virtually overnight, and that the effects of a failed financial
institution are not merely local but can reverberate around the globe.
If, as a result of the Barings collapse, financial institutions evaluate
and improve internal controls on risk management and regulators
undertake a more cooperative global approach, perhaps devastating
Barings-style collapses may be prevented in the future.  At a mini-
mum, steps taken to increase the level of confidence investors have in
the long-term stability of financial markets can only serve to benefit
all those associated with them.
Rochael M. Soper
115. See id.
